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Foreword
The late Prof M N Srinivas, one of the leading sociologists
of the world and the doyen of the profession in India til
he passed away on 30 November 1999, had held the J R D
Tata Visiting Chair at this Institute from the year 1991
when he joined us. His presence at the Institute was an
indication of our commitment to the value of
multidisciplinary research – combining scholarship in the
natural and social sciences – a commitment that has been
part of the vision that led to the founding of the Institute
by the late J R D Tata. Prof Srinivas believed fervently in
this vision. His world view encompassed all the
commentaries that man has made (and continues to make)
on his surroundings, ranging from religion at one end to
technology at the other; indeed he made us realize that
the two of them are not the ends of a spectrum. As a
member of the faculty of the Institute and as a coleague,
Prof Srinivas brought to us not only his great scholarship
in sociology and social anthropology but equaly great
wilingness to consider – warmly, enthusiasticaly – a wide
variety of issues with persons outside his own profession.
The fact that he was totaly free of the deep cultural
pessimism that is characteristic of large sections of the
Indian intelectual community helped create on our campus
a unique intelectual atmosphere that we hope enables us
to examine, with scholarship and integrity, the complex
issues that face Indian and global societies.
It was characteristic of Prof Srinivas during his years here
that, while he was busy compiling a colection of essays
titled Indian Society through Personal Writings , and editing
a volume on Caste, its 20th Century Avatar , he also spent a
great deal of time working with a group of scientists,
technologists, businessmen and management experts to
draw up what we caled the Bangalore Declaration , made at
a major information technology event that NIAS helped to
organize in November 1998. Just before he passed away
he was involved in another seminar organized jointly with
Prof Kenneth Keniston of MIT (and Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee
Visiting Professor at NIAS) on Equity and Diversity in
Information Technology ; and he had begun to work for an
international symposium on Religion and Society .
As a person that al of us valued as much for his scholarship
as for his human qualities, I and my coleagues at NIAS
felt that it was very important that his values must be
recaled in a series of lectures, to be given each year in
his memory. We are very fortunate that the first lecture in
the series is being given by another most distinguished
social anthropologist, Prof Triloki Nath Madan. His theme,
Religion in the Modern World , is one that was dear to
Prof Srinivas as wel. I am most grateful to Prof Madan for
taking time off to come and visit us at Bangalore to
deliver the first M N Srinivas Memorial Lecture.
Roddam Narasimha
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Professor Narasimha, Mrs. Srinivas, Ladies and Gentlemen,
I  stand before you this evening to
honour the memory of Professor M.N. Srinivas. I do so at
your invitation, and do not therefore stand alone, but
together with you in this act of remembrance and homage. 1
I met Professor Srinivas twice in 1999, first here at the
National Institute of Advanced Studies, when I was
privileged to have him chair my lecture to one of your
refresher courses, and a few weeks later in Delhi where he
came to give the inaugural golden jubilee lecture of the
Delhi School of Economics. On both occasions he reiterated
in person something that he had earlier writen to me in a
letter, namely that a legitimate concern about religious
fanaticism in India had, in recent times, uncriticaly led to
a generaly negative attitude to the place of religion in
society. He particularly regreted the fact that the study of
religion seemed to have falen out of favour with students
of sociology. In the last conversation I had with him in
Delhi he told me that he was planning to hold a seminar,
in about a year’s time, on the theme of religion and
society and that he would like me to participate in it.
Sadly he did not live to bring his proposal to fruition. In
choosing to speak today on religion in the modern world I
am fulfiling in a sort of way my commitment to him to
present a paper at his seminar.
*  *  *
Srinivas’s first major book was Religion and Society among
the Coorgs of South India.  Published by the Clarendon
Press at Oxford in 1952, it was soon recognized in scholarly
circles in India and the West as a major contribution.
Indeed it has since acquired the status of a modern classic
in social anthropological literature. Its principal strength
lay in a clearly articulated theoretical framework that
derived the understanding of social institutions from their
role in the maintenance of solidarity in society. Known as
‘functionalism’, he had come to appreciate its merits at
Oxford, where he wrote a doctoral dissertation under the
guidance mainly of the doyen of British social
anthropologists, A.R. Radcliffe-Brown. It was this work
1 This is an extended version of the spoken text of the Lecture delivered on
9th January 2001. While repetitions have been eliminated, some quotations,
footnotes and a list of references have been added. A summary of the Lecture
is also atached.
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that was published as the book I just mentioned. In a
sensitive autobiographical essay that he wrote many years
later, Srinivas confessed that, on reflection, he had realized
that functionalism tended to be overly neat, leaving no
loose threads to be tied, and narrow, and even dogmatic
(see Srinivas 1973).
One of the failngs of British functionalism, it is by now
wel established, was a narrow exegesis of French sociology
as it was shaped by Emile Durkheim and his colaborators
and pupils in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. Durkheim, the author of one of the greatest
books ever written by a sociologist, The Elementary Forms
of Religious Life  (first published in 1912), did indeed
consider social solidarity an outcome of assemblies of
people and the rituals they perform together – somewhat
like what is happening here just now! – but his conception
of the social significance of religion was much broader.
According to him, it was historicaly and everywhere the
source of morality, law, science and much else. And, as he
put it, ‘If religion gave birth to al that is essential in
society, that is so because the idea of society is the soul
of religion’ (Durkheim 1995, p.421). Durkheim’s ‘sociologism’
has been criticized for its excess and exclusivism, but the
deep insights into the nature of religious phenomena that
he ofered have stood the test of time.
The fact that the processes of secularization had gradualy
seen such domains as art, law and science move out of the
ambit of religion did not basicaly alter Durkheim’s vision
of the importance of religion to the human condition in
terms of what it does. ‘Its true function’, he asserted, ‘is
to make us act and to help us live’, not only routinely but,
more significantly, in the face of ‘the trials of existence’
and in enabling us to be ‘lifted above the human miseries’
(ibid., p.419). ‘Furthermore, insofar as religion is action
and insofar as it is a means of making men live, science
cannot possibly take its place’, just as religion is not ‘able
to tel science what do do’. But in the face of the advance
of science, Durkheim observed, ‘religion is itself an object
for science!’ With its scope delimited but not exhausted,
‘religion seems destined to transform itself rather than
disappear’ (ibid., p.432).
This was a profound conclusion to arrive at, particularly for
a French scholar. The spirit of the Enlightenment in France,
in contrast to the German version, was uncompromisingly
secularist. Denis Diderot’s ringing cal to man to ‘Have the
courage to free [himself] from the yoke of religion’ (see
Cassirer 1968, p.135) went beyond the advice of his great
German contemporary Immanuel Kant to man to ‘Dare to
know [and have] the courage to use [his] own understanding’,
which was, according to him, ‘the moto of the Enlightenment’
(ibid., p.163). The total war which French Encyclopaedism
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began against religious faith in al its forms was reinforced
by the Revolution with its strong anti-clericalism. Europe
had come a long way since the time Isaac Newton had
acknowledged a Supreme Inteligence and René Descartes
had atempted to provide a rational proof for the existence
of God.
In the anarchic aftermath of the Revolution and later,
some perceptive social thinkers, such as Auguste Comte
(who conceived of a positive science of society and gave it
the name of sociology), while sure that theological and
metaphysical varieties of knowledge had had their day,
stil recognized the need for functional equivalents of
religion to hold together society which stays in place not
by any natural law but by morals and symbols. Although
intelectualy obsolete, religion was socialy necessary (see
Preus 1987, p.109). Comte’s thinking was not, however,
radical enough. As Durkheim pointed out, Comte’s ‘attempt
to organize a [new] religion using old historical memories’
was doomed to failure. ‘There are no immortal gospels’, he
added, ‘and there is no reason to believe that humanity is
incapable of conceiving new ones in the future’ (1995,
pp.429-30). But, as already stated, the future scope of
religiosity would be limited: religion was already being
privatized. Civic morals and secular education respectively
would, Durkheim believed, provide new bonds of social
solidarity and new models of socialization.
The importance of secular education in the realization of
the Enlightenment vision of the perfectibility of social
institutions on the basis of reason and reasonableness to
constitute the modern world was obvious. Kant even alowed
religion in a kind of compromise, but ‘within the limits of
reason alone’. He stood steadfast against traditional
(revealed) religion (see Cassirer 1981, pp.383-97). The
eforts to understand and redefine religion in the light of
the Enlightenment coexisted with the attempts to explain
it away ( á la  David Hume, see Hume 1947).
It was left to Karl Marx in the mid-nineteenth century to
give the revolutionary call for the ending of ‘false
consciousness’, and for constructing the socio-economic
conditions under which this task could be accomplished.
Arguing that ‘man makes religion’, and using the metaphor
of ‘a reversed world’, in which it may seem that religion
makes man, Marx observed that religion was ‘the sigh of
the oppressed creature’ and ‘the heart of a heartless
world’, that it was ‘the opium of the people’ that kept
them in chains. And hence: ‘The abolition of religion as
the ilusory happiness of the people is required for their
real happiness. .. Religion is only the ilusory sun, which
revolves round man as long as he does not revolve around
himself’ (Marx and Engels 1959, pp.262-3). In place of
divine dispensation Marx instaled dialectical materialism
as the engine to change the course of human history. His
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teachings were to be reinforced, in course of time, by the
findings of Charles Darwin and Sigmund Frend. Together al
three were the gravediggers of religion – or so they
believed.
That the reign of religion in society was over seemed
compelingly obvious to most acute western thinkers at the
end of the nineteenth century, but among them there were
some who felt deeply uncomfortable about the implications
of this critical turn of the wheel of history. Marx had not
been dead a year when Friedrich Nietzsche published his
Gay Science  in 1882, in which he included a disturbing
parable about a madman talking about another madman. He
talked about a madman who ran into the morning, sunlit
market place, with a lantern in his hand, asking where he
could find God. The atheists among the crowd there made
fun of him, suggesting God may be hiding, or he may have
got lost, or perhaps he may have just gone away.
The madman jumped in their midst and pierced
them with his eyes. “Whither is God?” he cried. “I
shal tel you. We have kiled him  – you and I. Al
of us are his murderers. But how did we do this?
How could we drink up the sea? Who gave us the
sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What were
we doing when we unchained this earth from its
sun? ... God is dead. God remains dead. What was
holiest and most powerful of al that the world has
yet owned has bled to death under our knives: who
wil wipe the blood of us?.. “
Astonished by what he had said, the listeners fel silent,
hearing him say as he departed: ‘I came too early, my time
is not yet’ (see Kauffman 1974, pp.96-7). The narrator of
the parable, we may safely assume, is Nietzsche himself;
and we know that in the last decade of his life he was a
madman. What engaged him all his life was not the
expectation that the idea of God could be revived – in fact
he considered traditonal religions generaly and Christianity
in particular a blight – or the conviction that a new
religion should be founded. In the words of Walter Kaufman,
Nietzsche’s ‘greatest and most persistent problem’ was how
to ‘escape nihilism’: if one affirms the presence of God,
one denies the ultimate significance of the secular world;
if one denies the idea of God, everything else is robbed of
meaning and value (Kauffman ibid., p.101). Either way
one is a nihilst: there is no escape. It is arguable that
Nietzsche’s problem is indeed the predicament of modern
man/woman, echoed in Ivan Karamazov’s lament (in
Dostoyevsky’s great novel), everything is alowed when
God is dead.
The influence of Nietzsche’s thought on Max Weber
(a German sociologist of the same stature as Marx and
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Durkheim) may not be exaggerated, but there is no denying
the fact that these two German thinkers share a tragic
view of the implications of loss of religious faith. Not that
Weber considered the concerns of diferent religions similar
or the consequences of religious values the same everywhere.
Thus, while he believed that the Christian Puritan’s anxiety
about his salvation led through a chain of unforeseen
causality to the emergence of the spirit of capitalism in
Europe, he regarded Indian religions as the source of
ethics ‘which have abnegated the world, theoreticaly,
practicaly, and to the greatest extent’ (1958, p.323).
These are large and controversial theses which I cannot
discuss here.
More relevant is Weber’s vision of the nature of human
existence in modern society, ‘a world robbed of gods’ (ibid.,
p.282). He saw no future for religion. While the decline of
mystery, magic and ritual, which be described as
‘disenchantment of the world’, was a good thing in itself,
the long-term consequences of progressive rationalization
were likely to entail heavy costs. He foresaw modern society
overcome by a scientific-technological and manipulative
worldview and a consumerist lifestyle, deprived of legitimacy
in terms of ultimate values and thus rendered meaningless.
As he put it, ‘the ultimate and most sublime values have
retreated from public life either into the transcendental
realm of mystic life or into the brotherliness of direct and
personal human relations’ (ibid., p.155). The only values
that a secularized world knows are instrumental, and its
conception of perfection is synonymous with eficiency.
Expressing scepticism about science and its techniques
being capable of leading modern man to happiness, Weber
quoted Leo Tolstoy to the efect that science is ‘meaningless’
because it does not answer the most important question of
‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’ Taking the
example of ‘modern medicine’, and generalizing from it, he
said in 1916:
Whether life is worth living and when – this question
is not asked by medicine. Natural science gives us an
answer to the question of what we must do if we
wish to master life technicaly. It leaves quite aside,
or assumes for its purposes, whether we should and
do wish to master life technicaly and whether it
ultimately makes sense to do so (ibid., p.144).
In my reading of the sociological classics, I know of few
formulations regarding modern life that are more insightful
and more unsettling than the foregoing. Questions of
this kind have continued to be asked throughout the
twentieth century. Although some social scientists consider
them, and such concerns as ‘freedom’ and ‘dignity’ false
issues (see Skinner 1972), a secularized consciousness
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has sought to evolve a grammar of humanist values to
guide everyday life.
One of the best known of such attempts was the Humanist
Manifesto  of the American Humanist Association issued in
1933. Prepared under the guidance of the famous
philosopher John Dewey, it proclaimed that ‘the nature of
the universe depicted by modern science makes unacceptable
any supernatural or cosmic guarantees of human values’.
Further, it held, ‘Man is at last becoming aware that he is
responsible for the realization of the world of his dreams,
that he has within himself the power of its achievement’
(see Hitchcock 1982, p.11). Forty years later, a second
Humanist Manifesto,  signed by distinguished scientists,
philosophers and others, reiterated: ‘While there is much
that we do not know, humans are responsible for what we
are or wil become. No deity wil save us; we must save
ourselves. We affirm that moral values derive from human
experience. Ethics is autonomous  and situational, needing
no theological or ideological sanction’ (ibid., pp.13-14).
These manifestos were identified as religious, though non-
theistic (the term secular humanism came into vogue only
in the 1960s); they were grounded in empiricism,
pragmatism and relativism. A truly religious perspective
need not be theistic, but it has to have the conception of
ultimate values and a transcendant point of reference.
The decade of the 1960s was a kind of watershed in the
West in as much as it was marked by a resurgence of
interest in the religious legitimation of human life in a
recoil, as it were, from the regulative mechanisms of the
state. One of the remarkable afirmations of the religious
perspective was contained in the inaugural address of
John Kennedy as President of the USA in January 1961. He
invoked God three times but it is customary for American
Presidents to do so on such occasions. What is more
noteworthy is that, while he pointed out that power had
passed into the hands of a new youthful generation in his
country, he also proclaimed: ‘The rights of man come from
not the generosity of the state but from the hand of God’
(see Belah 1976, p.171). The master metaphor of ‘the
hand of God’ was employed to stress that, while sovereignty
rests with the people in a democracy, there is something
higher than the verdict of the people, a higher criterion of
the legitimacy of the state than the reasons of state that
Machiaveli had nailed to the masthead of modern political
thought. 2
2 Eleven days after this lecture was delivered, George W. Bush was sworn in as
the forty-third President of the USA. His inaugural address went wel beyond
the usual invocations to God and contained elements of the Christian faith,
which were a departure from convention. He also mentioned Judaism and
Islam, although only indirectly: ‘Church and charity, synagogue and mosque
lend our communities their humanity, and they wil have an honoured place in
our plans and in our laws’. This statement repudiates secular humanism which
derives a person’s humanity from his own self, certainly not from religious
sources. Moreover, it espouses a pluralist position similar to that of Indian
secularism, sarvadharma samabh ava.
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Kennedy’s words were echoed by Martin Luther King Jr. in
his own celebrated ‘I have a dream address’ at the ‘March
on Washington’ in August 1963. He demanded freedom and
justice for al Americans – ‘black men and white men, Jews
and Gentiles, Protestants and Catholics’ – on the ground
that they were ‘al God’s children’ (Lewis 1970, p.229). The
religious inspiration of the Civil Rights Movement was no
ordinary thing. Incidentaly, the metaphor of the dream, of
the dream converted into reality, might wel have been
borrowed by King from Mahatma Gandhi (ibid., p.210). I
need hardly remind you that the cardinal principle of
Gandhi’s politics was that it should be grounded in morality,
not expediency.
Politicians were not alone in recognizing the abiding place
of religious values in public life, a wide range of scholars
also were inclined the same way. The 1960s saw the
emergence of a highly complex ‘counter-culture’ movement
in the West spearheaded by the youth. At its centre lay a
deep dissatisfaction with the basic assumptions of the
Enlightenment and the resultant technocratic view of the
world. It had a broad range of expressions including, at
the one extreme, self-destructive and antisocial activities
and, at the other, a turning towards the mystical and the
spiritual. It was in this setting that the Hare Krishna
Consciousness (see Gelberg 1983), and Zen too, took root
on American university campuses. Those scholars who
applied themselves to a serious study of the phenomena
concluded that the quest of the youth was not ‘how shal
we know?’ but ‘how shal we live?’ It was ‘to discover ways
to live from day to day that integrate the whole of our
nature by way of yielding nobility of conduct, honest
fellowship, and joy’ (Roszak 1969, p.233). One hears
echoes here of Weber’s concern about the importance of
ultimate values and of Durkheim’s observation that
historicaly such values have come from the religious
traditions of humanity.
As the 1960s drew to their close efforts were stil on to
reconcile the religious and secular points of view. Some
Christian theologians argued that secularization must be
welcomed for it would not have occured unless God wiled
it (Cox 1965). At the same time, perceptive sociologists
began to wonder whether the ‘dessication’ of modern
culture, which was ‘what secularization [had] often meant,
might begin to be reversed’, and religion as ‘an imaginative
statement about the truth of the totality of human
experience’ reinstated (Belah 1970, p.244). The return of
the sacred to the secular world seemed a genuine possibilty.
There were other things happening, too, and other
perceptions of the prevailng social reality. Thus, Robert
Belah, the distinguished American sociologist (from whose
work I have already quoted) pointed out that shared
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historical experience of a people may generate values and
principles that enshrine, as it were, a kind of consensus on
national identiy expressed in a religious idiom. The longing
for celebratory togetherness that seems to be universal
may be fulfilled through ceremonies (such as the
inauguration of the President at which it is customary to
invoke the blessings of a non-denominational god on the
American people), commemorations (Thanksgiving, Memorial
Day) and holidays (the birthdays of national heroes like
Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King Jr.). The
commonalty thus conceived is the vision of a perfect
society, a yearning for ultimate values, clearly diferentiated
from the teachings of the churches, but elaborated and
instiutionalized as what Belah cals ‘civil religion’ (1970,
p.168-89). 3 Actualy he sees little scope for a complete
rupture with the religious mode of thinking even among
the votaries of secularism. He writes: ‘The notion of
secularization is far from a simple empirical generalization.
It is part of a theory of modern society, a theory that can
almost be caled a myth because it functions to create an
emotionaly coherent picture of reality. It is in this sense
religious, not scientifc at al’ (ibid., p.237).
What seemed marginal phenomena for quite some time
forced their way to the centre of the stage in many parts
of the world as the 1970s drew to their close. Not that the
processes of secularization were wholy reversed – far from
that – but alongside them, and in some respects in
opposition to them, there was a resurgence of religion in
public life, particularly in the political arena. The year
1979 was marked by a number of major events of such
resurgence, the most remarkable of which were, of course,
the Iranian and Nicaraguan revolutions. The same year the
Pope, head of the world’s largest Christian church, traveled
to Mexico at a time when a new movement of the 1960s
caled ‘liberation theology’, which sought to combine
Christianity and Marxism-Leninism, had spread among local
Christian communities in a number of Latin American
countries. Later that year the Pope also traveled to Poland,
lending his support to the Catholic church there in its
struggle against the communist state. In India, it was
around this time that Sikh fundamentalism made its
appearance as a political force, folowed in the mid-1980s
by a retreat into traditonal Islamic civil aw by sections of
the Muslim community, on the one hand, and an aggressive
assertiveness by a number of Hindu organizations, in
support of a Hindutva-based national culture, on the
other. As José Casanova puts it, apropos of Europe and the
Americas:
3 An American scholar of comparative religion, Gerald Larson, has suggested
that, as in America, ‘a Gandhian-Nehruvian Indic civil religion .. exists in
India alongside the various particular religious traditions’. It is marked by
national celebrations (Independence Day, Republic Day), and birthday holidays
commemorating, besides the founders of religions, Mahatma Gandhi (see
Larson 1995: 202-3).
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What was new and unexpected in the 1980s was not
the emergence of new “religious movements,”
“religious experimentation” and “new religious
consciousness” – al phenomena which caught the
imagination of social scientists and the public in the
1960s and 1970s – but rather the revitalization and
assumption of public roles by precisely those religious
traditions which both theories of secularization and
cyclical theories of religious revival had assumed
were becoming ever more marginal and irrelevant in
the modern world (1994: 5).
In Iran it was the Shia clerics, led by the fundamentalist
Ayatolah Khomeini, who wrested from liberals and Marxists
the leadership of the gathering storm against the campaign
for rapid modernization that the Shah’s regime had sought
to impose on society from above. Caling the bloody end of
the regime a ‘sacred’, ‘one hundred per cent Islamic’
movement, the Ayatolah, as the spiritual guide of the
Islamic republic of Iran, claimed inspiration from the
example of the early Islamic governance inaugurated by
the Prophet Muhammad himself. He proclaimed the end of
the era of westernization (which some Iranian intelectuals
had characterized as gharbzadegi,  ‘being stricken by the
West’) and its replacement by ‘the culture of the Quran’.
The book Fundamentals of Islamic Thought (1985), authored
by Khomeini’s protege Ayatolah Mutahhari, which served
as the manifesto of the revolution, is a strong chalenge
to modern, secular, scientific discourse and worldview (see
also Amuzegar 1991). The Iranian revolution showed no
mercy towards those it considered the enemies of the
Islamic way of life. It replaced terror by terror and shed
blood to avenge the blood of those it considered martyrs.
To commemorate the latter, a fountain was erected in a
public square in Tehran: lit up at night, the water looked
red like blood.
If the symbol of the Iranian revolution was the fountain of
‘blood’ – surely an awesome sight – the legitimizing
ideology of the Sandinista revolution, which overthrew the
police state in Nicaragua, and the subsequent reconstruction
of society, was ‘liberation theology’ (see Lancaster 1988).
Essentialy a form of praxis, it was evolved by theologians
who worked together with the poor and with political
workers at the grass-rools level, the so-caled ‘base
communities’. The dispossessed were the ‘flock’ in their
care and keeping. The higher rungs of the church were not
involved in this interaction and were even opposed to it.
Gustavo Gutierrez, who elaborated the notion of liberation
theology in the 1970s, wrote of the ‘eruption of the poor’
into the history of Latin America, not as some kind of a
secular revolt of the masses but as ‘an expression of the
presence of God within the tumult of real human history’
(Cox 1984, p.140). The Sandinista leadership originaly
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looked upon the ‘popular church’ at the community level
in purely pragmatic terms (even as the liberals and Marxists
had looked upon Shia clerics in Iran), but eventualy the
relationship between the guerila strategies of Sandino,
Marxism and Christianity become an organic one, making
it dificult to separate politics from religion. Christianity
became ‘the master plan around which other plans and
blueprints were organized’ (Lancaster 1988, p.57).
The Polish story of the political role of the Christian
church is of another kind. Poland found itself a
predominantly Catholic country at the end of the Second
World War with a church that had a long standing record
of standing up for the people (see Casanova 1994, chap.4).
The communist state was an imposition from Moscow,
engineered through a planted Workers’ Party. Its objective
was to abolish religious faith, alegedly a form of false
consciousness, and to end the threat to the state from
institutionalized religion. The church was engaged in a
batle of survival from 1948 to 1956. The people’s discontent
boiled over in what came to be known as the ‘bread and
God’ uprising of October 1956 (‘the Polish October’).
Thereafter the church opened out to espouse the human and
civil rights of agricultural and other workers. It presented
itself not merely as the nourisher of the Christians, but also
as the protector of Polish culture and the nation’s keeper. In
doing so, the church acknowledged the legitimacy of material
wants within a framework of morality, and the values of
religious freedom and freedom of conscience (after Vatican
II). It even associated itself with the Workers Defence
Committee in 1976. Al this led the way to the national
resistance and Solidarity movements and eventualy to the
colapse of the dictatorial state. The role of the Roman
Catholic church since then has been rather controversial: it
has taken an anti-pluralist stand in relation to other Christians
(notably Greek Catholics). It is not quite as vocal in support
of popular discontent as before, and seems to have become
‘an instrument in the aggressive assertion of national identiy’
(Hann 2000, p.17).
If the 1980s were marked by the emergence of religious
fundamentalist movements around the world, grounded in
scripturalism, questing for political power, intolerant of
dissent, and often violent (see e.g. Martin and Appleby
1991, 1995), the last decade of the century saw the
colapse of the communist empire and the eclipse of the
most rigorously worked out secularist ideology of society
and philosophy of history that have ever existed.
Revolutions, whether accompanied by terror or more benign
in nature, are of course big news, and they are not al lies.
It is not they alone, however, that have rendered religion
visible again in our time. There is much evidence of the
tenacity, even vibrancy, of publicly observed private religious
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faith, not only in countries that have been known for the
religiosity of their peoples – the examples of India and the
USA come readily to mind – but even in those that were not
so inclined in the past, such as Japan. The return of the
sacred in China and Russia only testifies to the coming into
the open of what was formerly suppressed. Ironicaly, the
accoutrements of modern society itself – economic wel-
being of increasing proportions of national populations;
quick, comfortable and afordable travel; ready information
and easy communication; etc. – faciltates the practice of
rel igion.
I remember hearing a lecture by the late Professor
A.L. Basham, distinguished historian, at the Institute of
Advanced Study, Shimla, in 1973,in which he remarked
that the emergence of the cult of Santoshi Ma as a new
goddess in the Hindu pantheon bore witness to the vitality
of some religious traditions. One hears little about this
cult nowadays, but yet another goddess, by no means new,
Vaishno Devi, draws pilgrims in their thousands to her
cave in Jammu from al parts of India virtualy throughout
the year. Many of them come to bargain with their goddess
for mundane favours, pledging gratitude for gift. The fact
that the government, the biggest employer of people in
the country, and other corporate employers, offer paid
holidays to their personnel has resulted in the combination
of religiosity and recreation. Pilgrimages within countries
and across countries are atracting larger number of devotees
than ever before. While the multitudes move, milions
watch them on their television sets, fulfiled through
vicarious participation, or simply entertained by the
spectacle. The midnight Christmas mass in St. Peter’s
Square in Rome is watched by milions of Christians and
non-Christians the world over. The same is true of the
annual Haj pilgrimage to Mecca in which Muslims from al
over the world participate. The Mahakumbha mela at Prayag
this winter has been named by the media as ‘the greatest
show on earth’; it too is being read and heard about and
watched worldwide. By the time it is over more than
twenty five milon people wil have visited Prayag, including
pilgrims hoping to wash off their sins, tourists seeking
amusement, merchants making money, and media persons
producing sensational news.
Looking at it in whichever way we may religion survives in
the world at the beginning of the twenty first century,
belying the expectations of those modern rational men and
women of a hundred years ago – and in fact of most of the
twentieth century – who were convinced that its days were
coming to their end. It not only survives as private faith
but has also reemerged as public religion (see Casanova
1994). It is a sign of the times that a scholarly work
published in the last year of the twentieth century bears
the title Why Gods Persist  (1999). The author, Robert
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Hinde, biologist and psychologist, characterizing his
approach as ‘scientific’, ‘examines why so many religions
continue to persist at a time when the answers they
provide to the basic questions of life are unacceptable to
many in the modern world’, and turns to ‘basic human
propensities’ for answers (p. 206). Needless to emphasize,
a reasonable answer to this and similar questions does not
have to be – indeed it should not be – in exclusively
religious or secular terms. The ‘totalizing propensity of
reason to absolutize the tension between sacred and profane
realms .. into irreconcilable contradictions’ (Seligman 2000,
p.132) has been the bane of discussions of the place of
religion in the modern world. 4 But a ‘theo-ethical
equilibrium’ – ‘a kind of integration between a religious
outlook and secularly grounded moral or political principles’
– is now coming to be considered ‘achievable’ (Audi 2000,
pp.212-3). This is a long way from the earlier certitude
(whether stated in Marxian or Weberian terms) about the
fateful transformation of religious into secular culture.
Indeed, it has been suggested that it is not al that
unlikely that future historians ‘wil look back on the period
from roughly 1750 to 2050 as a brief three-hundred-year
secular parenthesis in a history of humanity that has
always been religious’ (Seligman ibid.). I do not have the
time this evening to examine these arguments in any
detail. I have referred to them only to point out that,
curently, there is considerable evidence of serious rethinking
of the place of religion in modern society.
* * *
It is time to conclude. Let me begin with a clarification. If
I have spoken about the persistence of religion in modern
society, I have neither meant to suggest that religions
have not changed in response to the challenges of
secularization, nor wanted to recommend that religious
conceptualizations of the limitations of modernity be
uncriticaly accepted. Even less have I wanted to suggest
that we al become religious, whatever that means. I do
not believe that ethicaly commanding directives issue
from the social sciences generaly any more than they do
from the natural sciences. I know that the notion of a
value-free social science is not defensible in al contexts
and situations: for instance we have seen a fruitful coming
together of ethics and economics in recent times (see Sen
1994). But I do believe that, while sociologists should
study the value preferences of people, and spel out their
likely consequences, they may not, as sociologists,
recommend any selections. Such choices may truly be
4 Jayant Narlikar, the distinguished astrophysicist writes:
.. It is necessary to recognize that religion and science fulfil complementary
urges of the human mind. The problems come when there is a trespass of the
area of either one by the other. Thus, scientists should avoid passing value
judgements on religious thoughts without appreciating their very different
contexts. And religious thinkers should not try to look for postfacto justifcation
for their thoughts in the findings of science (2000, p.285).
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made by one only on the basis of moral or political
convictions that are personal even when they are shared.
In an article published in The Times of India  on 9 July
1993, Professor M.N. Srinivas wrote about the troubled
times, marked by runaway gadgetry, frenetic consumption,
and conflicts of various kinds, through which India was
then (and is now) passing. He observed:
It is in this overal context that the need for a new
philosophy and social ethic becomes urgent and
imperative. And that philosophy cannot be secular
humanism. It has to be firmly rooted in God as
creator and protector and the sustainer of human
societies. The fraternity of al human beings cuting
across divisions of race, ethnicity, caste, class, religion
and gender folows logicaly from the idea of God as
creator. The idea of human free wil is [present] in
al religions, and it provides the basis for individual
liberty without which there can be no true democracy.
Many sociologists were taken aback by Srinivas’s rejection
of secular humanism and by his plea for a God-centred
felowship of human beings. Sociology is after al a child
of the European Enlightenment. Several years later (in
1998), he told me that he had learnt from more than one
source that his article had evoked sharp criticism from
some of the ablest of his professional coleagues. But he
had no complaints, he said, nor had the criticism made
him change his opinion. What he had written were his
considered views, indeed his convictions, and he regarded
it as his duty to make them known.
Just as Professor Srinivas pursued his sociological studies
in the most rigorous manner, and tried to state his
conclusions without presuppositions or prejudice, he had
similarly given expression to his personal convictions
without fear or compromise. Nowhere in the article, it
should be noted, did he invoke sociological authority for
his views, but it may not be denied that many among the
reading public knew of his tal stature as the doyen of
Indian sociologists. He took the risks of misunderstanding
and disapproval, guided by his conscience, atma tushti,
alone. I put it to you, Professor Narasimha, Ladies and
Gentlemen, that M. N. Srinivas was a person of great
intelectual and moral integrity, deserving of high honours.
It is therefore in the fitness of things that the National
Institute of Advanced Studies, where Professor Srinivas
worked during the last years of his life, should have
instituted a Memorial Lecture in his honour. I applaud the
Institute’s decision. I am deeply indebted to NIAS, and to
Professor Narasimha in particular, for having afforded me
the rare privilege of delivering the first such lecture. And I
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am profoundly grateful to Mrs. Rukmini Srinivas for her
gracious presence in our midst this evening.
Thank you.
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A SUMMARY
The late Prof. M. N. Srinivas, who was the doyen of Indian
sociologists at the time of his death in 1999, had discussed
in a major work early in his career the social function of
ritual in sustaining society. Subsequently, he explored in a
number of shorter writings the historical dimensions of
Hinduism, the meaningfulness of the religious life, and his
own religious beliefs. In one of his last articles on the
subject, he expressed skepticism about the adequacy of
‘secular humanism’ in helping Indians to cope with the
problems of materialism and a conflict-ridden society. He
stressed the importance of ‘the idea of human free wil’,
which, he believed was ‘present in al religions’ and provided
‘the basis for individual liberty without which there can be
no true democracy.’ He did not however claim any
sociological authority for his views. Towards the end of his
life, Srinivas regreted that a legitimate concern about the
spread of religious fanaticism and fundamentalism in society
had overshadowed the positive aspects of religion as
personal faith and as a social force.
A widespread conviction among intelectuals in the West
at the beginning of the 20th century was that religion
was in the process of being driven out of collective
social life and privatized. The world was being rid of
mysteries, miracles and magic. Marx had recently
proclaimed that the abolition of religion was necessary
for the ‘real happiness’ of the people. There were others
who were equally convinced that the idea of God was
dead, but they were not sure that this was an unmixed
blessing. If the affirmation of the idea implied that the
secular world had no real significance, its denial meant
that, in the absence of a source of ultimate values,
everything became meaningless. The world of science and
rationality was grounded in instrumental values and such
criteria of perfection as efficiency. Questions about the
meaning of life and the significance of death were regarded
as of no or only remote interest. Humanity seemed to be
getting closer to mastering life technicaly, but whether
it made sense to do so was not considered.
A middle position was held by some thinkers, who argued
that, although religion was destined to disappear, there
was something eternal about its social function, namely
the maintenance of society through the formation of a
moral consensus about its legitimacy. If religion was not
going to be available any longer to do this, then secular
education or, more broadly, secular humanism would surely
fil the vacuum, and help to realize the Enlightenment
vision of humanity in charge of itself. The persuasiveness
of such ideas became stronger with the passage of time.
Around the beginning of the second half of the century,
many Christian theologians came forward with the novel
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thesis that the historical processes of secularization could
not but be the wil of God.
Signs of weariness about the secularist world view began to
emerge in the 1960s. Rethinking about alternative visions
of life among intelectuals went hand in hand with unrest
among the youth on university campuses. Movements
colectively referred to as ‘counter culture’ made their
appearance: they aimed at recovering the mystical and the
spiritual elements of human experience. In his inaugural
address (1961), John Kennedy, speaking for a new generation
in America, proclaimed that ‘the rights of man’ came from
not ‘the generosity of the state’ but ‘the hand of God’. This
was a reassertion of the religious or moral foundations of
politics, and reminiscent of what Gandhi had affirmed
throughout his public life. The notion that the separation of
the State and the Church in the USA had been made
possible by the emergence of a ‘civil religion’ rooted in the
colective experience of the American people as a nation
gained ground. Signs of a return of the sacred were, however,
considered marginal to the mainstream of world history.
The 1970s were marked by significant developments in the
so-caled peripheries of the world. In Nicaragua Catholic
priests formulated a ‘theology of liberation’, bringing
together Christianity and Marxism for promoting the forces
of economic and political emancipation. Eventualy the
combination of a socialy active Church, a redefined Marxism
and guerila tactics became crucial in the making of the
successful revolution that saw the end of a tyrannical
police dictatorship in 1978. Similarly, in Poland, the Catholic
Church first struggled for its survival under a communist
regime. It then emerged as a supporter of agricultural and
industrial workers and a defender of universal human
rights. It took on the role of being the ‘keeper’ of Polish
culture and the nation. It lent support to the Workers
Defence Committee (1976) that soon grew into the powerful
Solidarity movement which ended yet another dictatorship.
In Iran, however, the return of organised religion as the
foe of a westernized society and a ‘secular’ state, was
retrogressive. Here Marxist intelectuals joined hands
opportunisticaly with fundamentalist Shia Clerics who finaly
spearheaded the 1978 revolution, eliminating their
colaborators. Around the same time and throughout the
1980s, religious identities became assertive in India also.
Hindu communalism (Hindutva), Sikh fundamentalism
(Bhindranwale), and Muslim resistance (Shah Bano, minority
rights) vied with each other for public prominence. The
portentous aftermath of these confrontations is stil very
much with us.
Its worldwide ugly manifestations are not al there is to
religion. The colapse of the east European communist
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empire and the softening of Chinese communism have
resulted in an enormous resurgence of religious faith
among milions of people. A similar resurgence has occured
in Japan, and desecularization is reported from the
Scandinavian countries. Countries culturaly as disparate as
India and the USA remain largely religious. In short,
contrary to what was believed a hundred years ago would
happen has not happened: religion has not disappeared
from the world.
Ironicaly, public visibilty of religion has been aided in
various ways by the facilities of the modern world. More
than ever before, religious pilgrimages have become the
order of the day. Improved economic conditions, easier
and faster travel, combination of religious devotion and
secular tourism, media attention, etc. have transformed
religious activities into public performances. While
multitudes move, milions watch. For the religious minded
this may be vicarious participation, for others it is
entertainment. Images of the mid-night Christmas mass in
St Peter’s Square in Rome, or of Haj pilgrims gathered in
Mecca, persist in the minds of people. Currently, the
Kumbha mela occupies the front pages of newspapers and
preempts prime time on the electronic media. Such atention
focuses on the bizarre and the sensational. Be that as it
may, religion survives today – whether as personal faith,
defender of human rights, fanaticism, or sheer spectacle.
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